Much is unknown about the internal power dynamics between the Israeli military and political establishments with regards to Gaza. Occasionally, however, a statement made by officials or a document made public shed light on the tension between the largely pragmatic approach of the security establishment and the hawkish approach of the Netanyahu government.<\/p>\n
In October 2017, the IDF\u2019s journal \u201cMaarachot\u201d published an extraordinary article<\/a>. The article caused a stir in the public debate concerning Gaza, not just because of its content \u2013 which was worded carefully \u2013 but mainly due to its authors: the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, Major General Yoav (Poli) Mordechai, and his Adviser on Palestinian Affairs, Colonel Michael Milstein.<\/p>\n In the article, entitled \u201cSix Divisions or Two Million People? How Operation \u2018Protective Edge\u2019 Changed Israel\u2019s View of the Gaza Strip,\u201d Mordechai and Milstein discussed the conflict between Israel and Hamas in the summer of 2014, which cost the lives of over 2,100 Palestinians and 73 Israelis. The authors described the conflict not as a \u201cresult of planning, preparation and set intentions by both sides, but a degeneration into large-scale conflict, which none of the sides were prepared for or wanted.\u201d As in World War I, they wrote: \u201cthe two sides found themselves in a faceoff\u2026 stemming, at its core, from miscalculation and lack of mutual strategic clarity.\u201d<\/p>\n As far as Hamas was concerned, the reason the campaign lasted 50 days was the desire to wrest political concessions related to civilians\u2019 freedom of movement and improvements to Gaza\u2019s infrastructure, wrote Mordechai and Milstein. Hamas remains determined to preserve its political rule over the Gaza Strip and fought ferociously to preserve its position and channel internal agitation toward confrontation with Israel. Therefore, it was not religious ideology that drove it to attack Israel, but internal political and much more quotidian needs.<\/p>\n In the article\u2019s conclusion, the authors pointed to two approaches emerging in Israel concerning the ongoing crisis in Gaza: On the one hand, those supportive of \u201creaching a strategic settlement\u201d with Hamas, which would entail a ceasefire (\u201chudna\u201d or \u201ctahadeah\u201d). This path would provide Israel with stability in the south, but also raise tensions with the Palestinian Authority and Egypt and allow Hamas to further entrench its grip over the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, there are those who support increased involvement of the Palestinian Authority in the Strip \u2013 reinstating its control over border crossings, its presence in the border area, and control over civilian institutions (infrastructure and governmental offices unrelated to matters of security). This second alternative \u2013 which the authors doubted is even implementable \u2013 could potentially create, through a gradual process, an alternative to Hamas\u2019 rule. It is worth noting that the authors plainly disregarded a third alternative, which is quite popular in Israeli political discourse, and can be concisely described as \u201ctoppling Hamas rule.\u201d<\/p>\n Prior to assuming his position as minister of defense in April 2015, Avigdor Liberman vowed that when he takes over this role, the next campaign against Hamas \u201cwill be the last.\u201d A day before the 2015 elections, during a visit to Nativ Haasara<\/a>, a village neighboring the Gaza Strip, Liberman lambasted Prime Minister Netanyahu\u2019s non-confrontational approach toward Hamas. \u201cEliminating the rule of Hamas is the most important task of the government of Israel and as minister of defense, I will do this. We will not reach agreements and understandings with them. The only agreement that can be reached with Hamas is when they are buried under ground,\u201d he insisted.<\/p>\n Naftali Bennet, the former Minister of Education and member of the political-security cabinet of the previous government, made similar statements<\/a>. In a speech delivered during the inauguration of a medical school at the Ariel University, Bennet compared Hamas\u2019 demand to receive salaries for its civil servants in exchange for quiet along the border to blackmail attempts of the Italian Mafia: \u201cthose who surrender to protection rackets, will bring war upon us. Israel must not surrender to Hamas\u2019 protection threats.\u201d He added, however, that the military action he recommends does not necessarily entail a ground incursion into Gaza. Back in 2014, during Operation Protective Edge, Bennet stated<\/a> that toppling Hamas\u2019 rule is an option on the table, as far as he is concerned, but did not offer an alternative to the organization\u2019s rule in Gaza.<\/p>\n The bluster coming from ministers Liberman and Bennet was politically costly and proved that the Israeli public cares a great deal about the proper solution to \u201cthe Gaza problem.\u201d In his resignation speech<\/a> in November 2018, Liberman explained that he could not deliver on his election promises, chief among them the toppling of Hamas rule, and the assassination of Hamas leaders within 48 hours<\/a> of assuming his position. Liberman also lambasted the government for allowing the transfer of Qatari funds to Hamas. \u201cEveryone knew my positions when I entered the government, but it is unreasonable to prevent any offensive operations in Gaza and the next day ask why 48 hours have passed and Haniyeh is still alive,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n The day following Liberman\u2019s resignation, Bennet demanded to receive the position of minister of defense as a conditioning for remaining in the government, to \u201cmake Israel win again.\u201d \u201cFor dozens of years now, our systems have adopted a mental fixation of avoiding military confrontation with the enemy. An approach of disengagement. The enemy reads us and interprets it as fear of combat. The most dangerous thing for Israel is that we start thinking that there is no solution for terrorism, terrorists and missiles,\u201d said Bennet. \u201cWe have an excellent military, dedicated commanders and a top-notch general staff. At the same time, the role of the minister of defense is to challenge thinking, bring innovations, engender creative and surprising alternatives [to the ones proposed by the military establishment] \u2026 The role of the minister of defense is to initiate and lead policy, and not to be led.\u201d Two days later, Bennet dropped his demand and remained in the government.<\/p>\n In March 2019, as the election campaign intensified, Bennet clarified who, in his view, leads Israel\u2019s feeble \u00a0policy toward Hamas: the senior command of the IDF, which restricts the freedom of operation of the fighters and commanders in the field. In a series of tweets<\/a>, Bennet excoriated Benny Gantz, the Chief of Staff during Operation Protective Edge and his political rival, labeling him \u201cthe wet dream of Hamas,\u201d and \u201cthe general of indecisiveness.\u201d Outside of the political arena there were some who berated the IDF for its unwillingness to defeat Hamas. In an article published on the conservative website Mida<\/a>, Dan Sion, a retired lieutenant colonel and former squadron commander, criticized the leak \u2013 in the midst of Operation Protective Edge \u2013 of a secret presentation<\/a> created by the IDF, which included and assessment that clearing Gaza of offensive weaponry would take five years, would entail the death of thousands of Palestinians, and cost the Israeli economy ten billion NIS ($2.78 billion).<\/p>\n \u201cIs the IDF incapable of defeating Hamas in the Gaza Strip (with a reasonable cost) as presented, or is it disinterested in doing so?\u201d Asked Sion in the article, and determined that the latter option is correct. \u201cSince the 1990s, the IDF adopted characteristics of a \u2018post-modern military\u2019 that is fearful of incurring casualties, and prefers technological solutions and standoff weaponry over initiating face-to-face contact with the enemy\u2019s soldiers. The IDF is affected by civil society organizations and adapts itself to the media discourse of social elites. The IDF prefers \u2018managing conflicts\u2019 to ending them, and is willing to settle for \u2018an image of victory\u2019 rather than actual victory.\u201d<\/p>\n Contrary to Sion\u2019s argument, the pragmatic approach toward Hamas it not a result of post-modernist pressures exerted on the military from civil society organization. This approach originates from the heart of the military establishment. In a May 2018 interview<\/a> with IDF Radio, the former Head of the Shin Bet, Yoram Cohen, stated that it is not Islamist messianism that drives Hamas\u2019 calculations, but the organizations desire to \u201cbe a state like all other states, and be a people like all other people.\u201d Instead of toppling Hamas rule, the former Shin Ben head recommending improving the economic conditions in the Gaza Strip.<\/p>\n Yuval Diskin, Cohen\u2019s predecessor, made similar statements to residents of Israeli villages surrounding Gaza, several months after the 2014 conflict. \u201cWe need the economic situation in Gaza to improve,\u201d said Diskin to residents of Beeri, a kibbutz near Gaza, in November 2014. \u201cWe need to ensure that they are not using materials entering for the purpose of [manufacturing] weaponry. I think that if we and the international community make sure to create economic projects in the Strip, there is a chance that Hamas will prefer that situation over military confrontation.\u201d<\/p>\n Major General (retired) Giora Eiland, formerly the head of the IDF\u2019s Planning Directorate and former head of the National Security Council, adopts the most \u201cgenerous\u201d approach toward Hamas. According to Eiland, Gaza is \u201ca de-factor independent state for 11 years [now],\u201d whose interests completely align with Israel\u2019s short-term interests: avoiding a military conflagration and bringing about economic prosperity to the Strip. Eiland believes it is illogical to transfer aid funding to Gaza via the Palestinian Authority. \u201cIsrael needs to encourage Western and Arab states to invest in reconstructing Gaza, in cooperation with Hamas\u2019 government and not behind its back,\u201d he wrote in an article published by Yedioth Aharonot<\/a> in March 2018.<\/p>\n In the article, Eiland argued \u201cthe more this happens — the more power stations, desalination plans, or sewage treatment projects are created \u2013 the more Hamas\u2019 government will be restrained. I am familiar with the argument that Hamas will exploit the assistance just to build more tunnels, but I stake the opposing position: what has been happening in recent years is precisely because there are no negotiations with Hamas and Hamas is not given the money or the means directly. Hamas will invest more in civilian infrastructure if it is recognized as a de-facto state, if agreements are made with it requiting more strict monitoring over the cement and other [reconstruction] materials entering the Strip.\u201d<\/p>\n According to Eiland, the political divide between Hamas and Fatah is an internal Palestinian problem that does not have a short-term solution, and this split serves Israeli interests.<\/p>\n A similar contestation can be observed between the military and political ranks of Hamas. For example, the Spokesman of the armed wing of Hamas, Abu Oubeida, consistently supports armed struggle and lone-wolf attacks in the West Bank and sees them as the only avenue for struggle against Israel. On the other hand, leaders from the political wing, such as Hassan Yousef and Hossam Badran, a member of Hamas\u2019 Political Bureau (and member of the negotiating team for a settlement with Israel) , emphasize the need to pursue a political track, in line with the recognition of Israel within the 1967 borders, as it appears in Hamas\u2019 2017 Updated charter<\/a>.<\/p>\n Israel\u2019s unwillingness to recognize Hamas is reminiscent of the refusal to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yasser Arafat prior to the early 1990s. A combination of factors eventually led Israel to alter its position and pave the way to the Oslo Accords. These factors include (in no particular order of importance):<\/p>\n One of the elements that allowed Israeli to recognize the PLO was the gradual change in the position of the Palestinian organization: first the decision to limit its military activities to Israel and the occupied territories (and not carry out attacks abroad), and finally, the Palestinian 1988 Declaration of Independence, which called for abandoning the armed struggle in favor of a political track. A similar change has occurred within Hamas, from a combative 1988 charter to the more conciliatory document issued in 2017. Will Israel recognize the opportunity emerging from these developments?<\/p>\n Doves in the Government, Hawks in the Military<\/strong><\/p>\n Despite the aforementioned, it would be incorrect to claim a clear dichotomy between the hawkish political arena and a dovish military establishment. Within Netanyahu\u2019s cabinet there are pragmatic voices that clearly express the futility of a military-only approach to Gaza and support a civilian approach of rehabilitating Gaza. On the other hand, there are voices within the military-security establishment that challenge the perception that it would be beneficial for Israel to bolster the independence of the Gaza Strip from Israel,\u00a0 arguing that Israel\u2019s unwillingness to reconsider reoccupying Gaza emboldens Hamas.<\/p>\n For example, during the May 2018 military escalation between the IDF and Palestinian factions in Gaza,\u00a0 Minister of Transportation Israel Katz, argued that \u201cwe have no business in Gaza. Israel does not want to enter Gaza.\u201d Katz, who had proposed<\/a> a plan to reconstruct Gaza that entailed building an artificial port off of Gaza\u2019s coast, argued that Gaza should be allowed to trade with the outside world under Israeli security oversight. \u201cThis is not a reward for Hamas,\u201d Katz asserted, \u201cit is a reward for Israel. I don\u2019t want to grant Hamas control over two million people as a result of Israeli jailing them and shutting them out.\u201d Six months later, during another conflagration between the IDF and Hamas following a botched operation of an elite IDF unit deep inside the Gaza Strip, cabinet member Yuval Steinitz<\/a> argued that the government \u201cis not interested in being dragged into an unnecessary war that has no real strategic goals, as far as Israel is concerned.\u201d Steinitz pointed out the consensus between the political echelon and the military establishment concerning Gaza, emphasizing the devastating cost in human lives and destruction of property in Israel of an operation to occupy Gaza and topple Hamas.<\/p>\n On the other hand, Lieutenant General (retired) Gershon HaCohen, the former Commander of the IDF\u2019s Military Colleges and currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center, argued in an article published in Israel Hayom that Hamas has no interest to become more moderate as long as it knows that Israel will never act to topple it. \u201cIsrael\u2019s need to maintain the disengagement that was achieved in Gaza is one of the elements that pushed us into a corner. This Israeli need gave rise to the perception of the futility of an attack on Gaza: why reconquer if we want to leave and disengage again?\u201d wondered<\/a> HaCohen. \u201cPrime Minister Netanyahu, who wishes to avoid the overall framework of the two-state solution, has a clear interest in the emergence of an independent Hamas state in Gaza, and it is preferable in his view to maintain the Strip\u2019s current rulers. Hamas\u2019 leadership has wisely exploited this conundrum, displaying strategic prowess that should be studied.\u201d<\/p>\n Israel\u2019s political leadership is unable to decide between the two paths before it. Alongside bellicose threats of toppling Hamas and engaging in rounds of conflict with varying degrees of intensity, in January 2019 the government approved<\/a> transferring millions of dollars to Hamas for payment of salaries to its civil servants and needy families. Israel continues to maintain contact with Hamas, through Qatari and Egyptian mediation, and occasionally through the Europeans, including the German<\/a> and Norwegian<\/a> governments. At the same time, when the Europeans engage Hamas without Israeli approval, Jerusalem reacts forcefully. For example, in November 2017, Minister of Defense Liberman barred<\/a> the entry of Swiss representatives to Gaza after Swiss diplomats met with Hamas\u2019 leadership in the Strip.<\/p>\n Meanwhile, the negotiations concerning a long-term agreement mediated by Egypt, are continuing regardless of the occasional escalatory rounds. Thus, only days after two rockets were fired at Tel Aviv, in an act defined by Hamas as \u201can error\u201d (a claim confirmed by Israeli defense officials), Israel resumed negotiations<\/a> on easing the closure of the Gaza Strip.<\/p>\n The Complex Approach of the International Community toward Hamas<\/strong><\/p>\n The 2006 decision of the International Quartet (the United States, the United Nations, the European union and Russia) concerning Hamas continues to guide the approach of the international community vis-\u00e0-vis the organization. According to this decision, the Quartet will recognize and engage Hamas only if it adopts three fundamental conditions: recognition of Israel, recognition of previous accords signed between the Palestinians and Israel, and abandoning its armed struggle. As a result, the EU and most Western countries continue to list Hamas as a terror organization and avoid official engagement with the movement. Russia and China, on the other hand, do not view Hamas as a terrorist organization. Laws in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom distinguish between the armed and political wings of the organization, listing only the armed wing as a terrorist group.<\/p>\n The hardline approach of the Quartet toward Hamas after its victory in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections was not a given. James Wolfensohn, the Quartet\u2019s Envoy to the Middle East, resigned from his position less than a year after assuming it, because he felt that the constrains placed on Hamas<\/a> \u2013 and particularly the abrogation of the Crossings Agreement and confiscation of Palestinian taxes \u2013 were preventing him<\/a> from properly fulfilling his role.<\/p>\n There are also multiple voices in U.S. and European think-tanks calling for recognition and engagement with Hamas. Back in 2006, a few months after its election victory, Henry Siegman<\/a>, a researcher of Palestinian politics at the prominent American think-tank Council on Foreign Relations, detected signs of moderation in Hamas\u2019 leadership (particularly due to its decision to halt financing of suicide bombings), and called on Israel and the United States to engage with the organization. His research quoted former Mossad chief, Efraim Halevy, who called for combating Hamas\u2019 terrorism while at the same time allowing it to become incorporated into the Palestinian political system.<\/p>\n\n