This emerging quartet of Saudi, Pakistan, Turkey and Egypt could become a leading military and economic bloc, one with close ties to China<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Emerging Blocs and New Security Paradigms<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
We have already written<\/a> extensively about the collapse of the strategic conception long held by the Sunni authoritarian regimes of the Gulf. The war against Iran finally laid bare the fact that American-Israeli power may strike hard, but it cannot deliver the security and stability craved by these petrocracies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Many writers offered<\/a> as alternative: deeper cooperation among the region’s Muslim powers \u2013 Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan. Elements of this vision are beginning to take shape in the form of intensified diplomatic contacts, security dialogues, and ad hoc alignments on specific issues. Reports also point to closer<\/a> military ties between Turkey and Egypt, a reversal of the cool relations they maintained in recent years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This emerging quartet could become a leading military and economic bloc, one with close ties to China, which needs both Saudi oil and Islamic legitimization for its repression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. These geopolitical developments add a layer of strategic complexity for Washington, in the context of its rivalry with Beijing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n An article<\/a> by Miki Luzon draws an important distinction between the way the United States and China cultivate alliances in the Middle East. The former favors bilateral deals that deliver immediate value over the construction of long-term alliances. That distinction is important: it belies a simplistic reading of the quartet as a “pro-China bloc,” and instead helps us understand the great powers\u2019 maneuvers as an ongoing, multilateral process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, a partnership continues to take shape between the countries marginalized by this emerging framework: the UAE and Israel. A profound analysis<\/a> by Elizur Gluck shows that Israel itself has become an active player rather than a bystander in some arenas of regional fragmentation. Where Saudi Arabia and its allies tend to back old, centralized regimes, Israel and the UAE tend to support separatist or quasi-autonomous actors, often as a deliberate tool for weakening rivals and securing footholds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yemen is the most obvious case. The battle over Yemen has grown far more significant since the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the gateway to the Red Sea, was blocked by the Houthis in 2023. Israel has a direct strategic stake in who controls that chokepoint. For years, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) has been a key vehicle for Emirati influence in southern Yemen, as well as an indirect channel for Israeli interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Public reporting also suggests that it has become an increasingly attractive interlocutor for Israel as it explored normalization, a sign that Israeli involvement in Yemen’s fragmentation goes beyond quiet UAE-backed diplomacy to directly cultivate a friendly separatist actor on the strait. A short clash in early 2026, followed by the replacement of Emirati forces with Pakistani troops, has for now ended that possibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Beyond Yemen, Israel and the UAE back additional separatist actors in the Red Sea that further destabilize the region. On the opposite shore of the strait, Somaliland is a striking example: Israel is among the very few states to recognize its independence claims, and the UAE is its principal ally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The separatism promoted by the Israeli-Emirati collusion directly conflicts with efforts by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt to maintain the unity and hegemony of their preferred centralist regimes in the region<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Recognition by Israel gives Somaliland a degree of international standing it could not otherwise claim, deepening its dependence on Israel and the UAE as its main external patrons in a crucial geopolitical spot that carries direct strategic weight for Israel’s shipping and security concerns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That recognition may or may not translate into direct control over realities on the ground just yet, but it locks Somaliland ever more tightly into the Israeli-Emirati orbit. Some analysts warn that such reliance on external patrons may ultimately erode the autonomy of entities like Somaliland, drawing cautious parallels with other breakaway entities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A further example of UAE-fueled separatism<\/a> is Sudan. In near-total contrast to the rest of the Middle East’s important states, which back the Sudanese national army, the UAE finances the so-called Rapid Support Forces (RSF) \u2013 the murderous militia descended from the Janjaweed, who had perpetrated the Darfur genocide some twenty years ago.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The members of the new regional quartet all regard the RSF as an enemy. Egypt has gone as far as striking convoys carrying UAE-supplied weapons to the RSF from Libya. Those Egyptian strikes, together with Saudi strikes on UAE-linked arms convoys in Yemen, illustrate how far these states have drifted apart.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thus, the separatism promoted by the Israeli-Emirati collusion directly conflicts with efforts by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt to maintain the unity and hegemony of their preferred centralist regimes in the region. Curiously enough, this separatist challenge has in the last decade come mainly from Iran and the Axis of Resistance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Israel-UAE partnership also matters for India. The world’s largest country maintains warm relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia, but its ties to Israel and the UAE stand out. Luzon notes<\/a> that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has visited both countries recently, continuing to deepen the security cooperation he has built with them since the start of his term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unlike China, India and Israel are partners in the defense industry, and there are reports of major security cooperation between India and the UAE amid the war with Iran. India is also promoting the India-Middle East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Running from India through the UAE and Saudi Arabia to Israel, and from there to Europe via Greece, it is envisioned to bypass the Suez Canal (and to some extent the Strait of Hormuz) and turn Israel into a significant transit hub for goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At least in theory, the IMEC could also compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and interest in developing it has even led some Israeli commentators<\/a> to call for a genuine alliance between Israel, India, and the UAE.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unlike Yemen, Somaliland, and Sudan, where no ruler holds sway, Syria presents a different and more interesting picture \u2013 one where Israel’s role as a destabilizing force is especially pronounced. In a new and compelling piece<\/a>, forum fellow Elizabeth Tsurkov traces the evolution of relations between Syria’s new regime and its central ally, Turkey, from 2020 through the fall of the Assad regime in 2024 to today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tsurkov shows that al-Sharaa had consistently tried to chart an independent course rather than simply serve as Turkey’s proxy. That tendency grew even stronger after Assad’s fall, as al-Sharaa adopted a cautious approach aimed at preserving good relations with the wider Arab world, the West, and<\/em> Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Indeed, he chose not to attack the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as his Turkish sponsors demanded, until it suited his own plans. He also curtailed the influence of Turkish-aligned figures within the new Syrian army and its intelligence services. Diplomatically and in the media as well, al-Sharaa turned toward Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which can provide the funding he needs to improve the Syrian economy and consolidate his power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here as well, Israel stands out as a destabilizing agent. It has continued to strike inside Syrian territory, has expanded its military footprint beyond the occupied Golan Heights, and has deepened its backing for Druze and Kurdish autonomy movements. All these actions undercut al-Sharaa’s efforts to consolidate a unified national army and intelligence apparatus, and keep the new regime’s territorial control fragmented and contested.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Relations with Israel, which looked promising in the first year of al-Sharaa’s rise, have cooled precisely because Israel refuses to give up its hold on the Syrian Golan and has avoided advancing any security agreement with the new regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The balance of power that has shaped the political thinking of many Israelis in recent years \u2013 Israel, the United States, and the Gulf states on one side, Iran and its allies on the other \u2013 is no longer relevant<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\nThe UAE’s Ties with Israel and the Question of Separatism<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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Syria-Turkey Relations: Balancing Support and Autonomy<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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