Yesterday (27), Ben Caspit published in Maariv that "Western intelligence sources" claim that King Abdullah has come to the conclusion that the Israeli government is interested in taking advantage of the changes brought about by the Arab Spring in the regional order to overthrow his rule, overthrow the monarchy and turn Jordan into a Palestinian state. Caspit claimed that these intelligence sources indicated that many messages and hints had reached Amman that Prime Minister Netanyahu had in fact adopted Foreign Minister Lieberman's plan to treat Jordan as a Palestinian state, and therefore to claim that the residents of the territories should exercise their political rights in Jordan. The commentator added that Ministers Barak and Meridor strongly oppose any damage to relations with Jordan, but "it is not clear whether the issue has reached any practical discussions."
The article promised that the "full story" would be published in Maariv's Shabbat supplement, but today he gave his remarks very financially. He omitted the reference to "Western intelligence sources", refrained from mentioning the prime minister on his behalf in this context, and omitted any hint of any reflection by the Israeli government on Jordan and the Hashemite regime. Instead, Caspit claimed that "Avigdor Lieberman's political doctrine" of turning the territories into Palestinian autonomy that would be linked to post-Hashemite Jordan "had taken over the Israeli agenda." Caspit admits that the decision between this plan and the idea of two states for two peoples is not easy, and even when a decision has been made it is not certain that it is the right one, since we "live in a crazy area".
Although it can be assumed that Foreign Minister Lieberman and members of his party do not oppose the idea of "Jordan is Palestine," it is not explicitly mentioned in the political platform of "Israel Beiteinu." Lieberman has not mentioned anything in this spirit in recent years, and certainly not since he was appointed foreign minister. However, his party does not refer to the existence of a Palestinian "state" as a target, and is content with the claim that an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement will be established only through the exchange of territories and populations. A hint of Jordan's role in this context is found only in the reading of Yisrael Beiteinu For a "regional solution in which Egypt and Jordan will participate." In contrast, small parties to the right of the Likud, such as the National Union and Hatikva, openly embrace the idea of "Jordan is Palestine." They do not call for a transfer – the Palestinians in the territories will be "allowed" to remain in their places of residence – but not a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River, since, according to these parties, it already exists east of it. According to this system, the Palestinians in the territories will gain autonomy in a federal framework with Jordan, and their political rights will be exercised therein. These parties are not bothered by the identity of the government in Jordan , since in any case it will rule over a population that does not want the existence of a Jewish state west of the river.
One way or another, the question of whether the idea of "Jordan is Palestine", in its various versions, is the domain of relatively small right-wing parties or whether it is also accepted by "Israel Beiteinu" and perhaps even the Likud, has no special significance. Caspit's over-caution, compared to his allusions in the first article, does not raise or lower the question: the question is not whether the Israeli leadership refuses to discuss the Jordanian-Palestinian issue publicly, but whether its position on this issue has shifted in the general political and public discourse in Israel following the Arab Spring. ". In this context, it has already been noted here that the idea of exercising Palestinian sovereignty within the framework of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation has long been not the domain of the radical right in Israel alone, and that the two former heads of the National Security Council, Island and Dayan, have called it one way or another.
The possibility that the Arab Spring has eroded the perception of decision-makers in Israel that the Hashemite regime will secure Israel from an "Eastern Front" must not be ruled out . It is also likely that the worsening Jordanian-Palestinian rift in Jordan, and the growing criticism from all sides of the regime in the internal arena, are seen as a temporary reason for Israel to evade the decision to recognize another Arab state west of the river, pending developments in Jordan. As in the past, Israel is once again being dragged into the hope that Jordan will take the chestnuts out of the fire for it.
Beginning in 1993, both the Israeli governments and the Hashemite regime missed the golden opportunity to contain Palestinian sovereignty in distinct territory: Israel did not define it as a strategic goal of its foreign policy and did not implement it anyway, and Jordan, for its part, did not define it as a strategic goal of domestic policy. It did not integrate the Palestinians into the public sector and the political system, nor did it make a legal decision on the West Bank's status in the constitution and on how to implement the decision to sever ties from July 1988. Very high price.
Under the circumstances, a decision not to make a decision may seem like a bad thing to a minority. However, in the absence of any political decision by Israel and Jordan's internally on the Palestinian question, the two states will be dragged, voluntarily or involuntarily, into severe internal distress, new political measures and finally, God forbid, a strategic confrontation. If there is indeed a political drift in Israel on the Jordanian-Palestinian question, only a thin thread – even if important – still binds the two countries, and that is the position of the military-security establishments on both sides. But in the current situation, even in this level, resilience will never be the same – both in Jordan and in Israel.